Is stock liquidity transferred and upgraded in acquisitions? Evidence from liquidity synergies in US freeze-outs by Konstantaras, Konstantinos & Sogiakas, Vasilios
This is a peer-reviewed, final published version of the following document, © The Author(s) 2018 and is 
licensed under Creative Commons: Attribution 4.0 license:
Konstantaras, Konstantinos and Sogiakas, Vasilios (2019) Is stock 
liquidity transferred and upgraded in acquisitions? Evidence from 
liquidity synergies in US freeze-outs. Annals of Operations Research, 282 
(1-2). pp. 179-216. ISSN 0254-5330 
Official URL: http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/s10479-018-2870-7
DOI: http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/s10479-018-2870-7
EPrint URI: http://eprints.glos.ac.uk/id/eprint/7490
Disclaimer 
The University of Gloucestershire has obtained warranties from all depositors as to their title in the material 
deposited and as to their right to deposit such material.  
The University of Gloucestershire makes no representation or warranties of commercial utility, title, or fitness 
for a particular purpose or any other warranty, express or implied in respect of any material deposited.  
The University of Gloucestershire makes no representation that the use of the materials will not infringe any 
patent, copyright, trademark or other property or proprietary rights.  
The University of Gloucestershire accepts no liability for any infringement of intellectual property rights in any 
material deposited but will remove such material from public view pending investigation in the event of an 
allegation of any such infringement. 
PLEASE SCROLL DOWN FOR TEXT.
Ann Oper Res (2019) 282:179–216
https://doi.org/10.1007/s10479-018-2870-7
S.I. : APPLICATION OF O. R. TO FINANCIAL MARKETS
Is stock liquidity transferred and upgraded in
acquisitions? Evidence from liquidity synergies in US
freeze-outs
Konstantinos Konstantaras1 · Vasilios Sogiakas2
Published online: 12 May 2018
© The Author(s) 2018
Abstract This paper investigates the value successful bidders generate from acquiring less
liquid targets. This synergy is traced with both theoretical and empirical evidence from the
squeeze-out stage of going private transactions, when bidders hold sizeable toeholds in target
shares. By transferring their superior liquidity, acquirers can add value to the valuation of
their toeholds in fully acquired target assets. We use a sample of US delisted targets from
globally listed acquirers over 25 years, and, in line with our theoretical analysis, a nonlinear
relation is evidenced between the expected added value from liquidity transfer and illiquidity
differences. The adjustment of target market prices for the attached option to participate in
the bid in a new stochastic volatility framework reveals that the bulk of deal-generated wealth
depends on the offered option. Although the market penalizes the mean acquirer with negative
abnormal returns, those with higher liquidity differences from their targets are suffering less
because of their greater potential of liquidity transfer synergy. The analysis of the probability
that the offered option gets in the money reveals that liquidity transfer acts as a catalyst for
successfully concluding the deal and underlies underbidding.
Keywords Liquidity · Going private · Squeeze out · Freeze out
1 Introduction
The puzzle of why acquirers of unlisted and subsidiary targets earn higher abnormal returns
than those of public firms is attracting academic interest. The main reason is that none of the
existing theoretical suppositions, namely synergy, target financial liquidity, target valuation
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uncertainty, and target bid resistance, are able to adequately account for this phenomenon
(Jaffe et al. 2015). This paper suggests an explanation based on stock liquidity differences
between the acquirer and its target. The important role for both bidder and target stock
trading liquidity in mergers and acquisitions (Massa and Xu 2013; Officer 2007) is extended
to acquisitions of less liquid targets. We suggest that bidders with superior stock trading
liquidity can transfer their liquidity characteristics to their fully acquired targets through
going private transactions. In a stock market environment where liquidity is valued, rendering
acquired assets more liquid can lower the required investor returns, increase their market price
(Amihud and Mendelson 1986) and generate value to bidders. We empirically estimate and
attest the existence of these liquidity synergies in going private deals where the transfer
of liquidity is monetized, upon successful deal consummation, on the valuation of bidder
toehold in target shares. Although overall bidder abnormal returns are not positive, in line
with the existing empirical findings (Bates et al. (2006), henceforth BLL), in tandem with the
market’s higher expectation of liquidity transfer synergies, they become less negative. Valuing
the target shareholder’s option to participate in the bid with a methodologically improved
stochastic volatility valuation, we find supporting evidence of liquidity transfer’s contribution
to underbidding. Last but not least, liquidity transfer synergy reduces the probability that
the bid is overbid, in line with Amihud et al. (2004) theoretical model. To the best of our
knowledge, we are the first to formally estimate with our new methodology these liquidity
synergies, based on a simple theoretical framework, offering a plausible solution to the puzzle.
These synergies can arise on the valuation of their toehold in target’s stock, whenever
acquirers with a more liquid stock acquire less liquid, listed, or unlisted targets. In particular,
the value stemming from this synergy is rendered measurable by taking a closer look at the
economics of squeeze-outs,1 the last stage of going private deals. At this point, bidders, with
a sizable toehold in the target, offer cash or stock to the remaining minority shareholders
with the publicly announced intention to collect in excess of a 90% stake and subsequently
remove it from the exchange. It is worth stressing that at this point there is no need to pay
a control premium, facilitating the isolation of its target toehold liquidity’s impact on the
acquirer market value. Because at the squeeze-out stage bidders hold sizeable toeholds, to
the extent that there is a scarcity of target shares, the illiquidity of the target stock and its
margin of liquidity difference from the bidder become magnified. The value from liquidity
transfer is reflected by the disappearance, following the delisting, of the market’s double
discounting of a bidder’s toehold valuation with a target’s illiquidity, on top of the bidder’s
own stock liquidity discount. This double liquidity discount stems from the disparity of the
secondary market liquidity profiles2 between the two stocks, reflecting the differences in their
individual (Fang et al. 2009) and market trading characteristics (Sarr and Lybek 2002). The
termination, following the squeeze-out, of the target’s separate market trading removes its
own liquidity discount and registers a commensurate increase on the valuation of the bidder’s
toehold.
To what extent are the hypothesized liquidity-related synergies incorporated in market
prices? The analytical measuring of liquidity synergies exposes that bidders taking advantage
of these synergies increase their share of deal-generated wealth in more illiquid target freeze-
1 Other terms given for the last stage of going private deals and used interchangeably herein are “squeeze-
out,” “going private merger,” “parent-subsidiary merger,” “minority buyout,” “take out,” or “cash-out merger”
(Subramanian 2007). The reader is referred to this paper for an in-depth analysis of the legal aspects and
insightful discussion. The terms squeeze-out and freeze-out are used herein interchangeably.
2 For instance, although a wholly owned subsidiary of an NYSE listed parent firm witnesses a severe liquidity
markdown if sold privately (Officer 2007), its theoretical value as an integral element of the parent’s market
capitalization is discounted with the relatively thinner parent company-wide liquidity discount.
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outs. Ideally, we would like to compare bidder wealth in the numerous acquisitions of private
companies from listed bidders where the liquidity difference margin is more pronounced.
However, we can only account for the relative improvement in target stock liquidity for
listed targets. Hence, the impact on bidder announcement abnormal returns is estimated and
tested on the full sample of 162 US listed firms gone private from their global, albeit mostly
US-listed, parents during the 25 years from 1990 to 2014.
In this respect, several econometric challenges need to be circumvented. The first is the
prevailing squeeze-out target illiquidity, depicting trading gaps lasting for several days. This is
addressed with the trade-to-trade returns adjustment (Maynes and Rumsey 1993). Employing
this adjustment in measuring bidder Cumulative Abnormal Returns (CAR) and allowing for
the appreciation in their toehold in target shares (Bates et al. 2006; Malatesta 1983) pinpoints
that acquirers with liquidity transferring synergies outstrip targets’ share. Our results contrast
the existing findings for mergers and acquisitions (Andrade et al. 2001) and squeeze-outs in
particular (Bates et al. 2006; Croci and Petmezas 2010). It is shown that a lower proportional
share of the economic rents accrues to the target’s minority shareholders in the overwhelming
majority of the US freeze-outs. Bidders capture a bigger part for more illiquid squeeze-out
targets.
The next econometric hurdle imposed is isolating the target’s theoretical equity value
from the market price, which includes the implied option to receive cash or bidder stock. As
discussed in Bhagat et al. (1987), the degree to which the offered option is “in the money,”
i.e. the margin by which the offering price exceeds the target’s underlying equity, indi-
cates the market’s assessment of intra firm synergies and their relatedness with the target’s
equity. The existing empirical literature follows their suggested estimation method to calcu-
late the option value in a Black–Scholes, non-stochastic, volatility framework. To account
for the time-varying volatility prevalent in the examined deals, a new stochastic option val-
uation framework is developed herein on the basis of Heston and Nandi’s (2000) model. In
stock exchange offers, market prices are adjusted for the attached exchange options follow-
ing Bjerksund and Stensland (1993). Nonparametric tests indicate a significant difference
between the estimated option-adjusted and unadjusted returns, registering more than 77.5%
of the average CAR in our sample due to the options granted from the bidder. A second
methodological improvement in the analysis is introduced with the estimation of the prob-
ability that the granted option is “in the money” as a function of the offered price and the
expiration term (Madan et al. 2008). On this basis we find strong evidence that liquidity trans-
fer synergies increase the probability that this option gets “out of the money.” This finding
shows that the more bidders stand to benefit from liquidity transfer synergies, the less they
propose to the underlying. Bidders can aggressively capitalize on liquidity transfer synergy
without a commensurate increase in the premium offered to a target’s minority shareholders
because it can escape the “Fair Value” adjudication imposed by Delaware courts.3
The remainder of the paper includes a brief literature overview, which includes the liquidity
transfer analysis, in Sect. 2, followed by a description of the empirical methods, including
the implied option estimation, in Sect. 3. Section 4 describes our data. Section 5 presents and
discusses the results. Section 6 summarizes and concludes the paper.
3 US courts, in the case of merger squeeze-outs, can determine fair value for the target’s stock, unlike tender-
offer squeeze-outs. In the former, the fair valuation process ignores the target’s recent market price, whereas
in the latter, market prices play the most influential role (Subramanian 2007). Hence, the illiquidity discount
may only play a role in fair market valuations during tender-offers as opposed to mergers, which explicitly
rule it out (Hamermesh and Wachter 2009).
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2 Literature review and theoretical formulation
2.1 Liquidity transfer analysis
Acquirers perform better in acquisitions of unlisted or subsidiary targets (Faccio et al. 2006).
Jaffe et al.’s (2015) research examines the competing theories which can explain why less
liquid, unlisted targets generate higher acquirer returns. Their work empirically dismisses
Fuller et al.’s (2002) and Officer’s (2007) financial constraints, Cooney et al.’s (2009) under-
diversification and risk-aversion and Baron’s (1983) target management resistance theories
as explanations. However, although Amihud and Mendelson (1986) suggest that more liquid
securities are more valuable, Jaffe et al. (2015) do not include stock liquidity, as opposed to
financial liquidity, in their analysis.
Going private deals constitute a subset of acquisitions in which trading illiquidity plays
a theoretically acknowledged role. The literature emphasizes, besides avoidance of listing
costs and subdued benefits from retaining a listing (Mehran and Peristiani 2010), illiquidity as
the underlying driver. The probability of going private increases, according to the theoretical
models of Holmstrom and Tirole (1993) and Boot et al. (2006), for illiquid firms lacking
investor attention. The higher the liquidity, the more easily arbitrageurs can gather large
hold-out stakes before the deal announcement and bargain for an amplified premium (Jindra
and Walking 2004). Hence, the premium paid in going private deals critically depends on
the target’s stock liquidity and is cheaper for less liquid targets (Gomes 2001; Cornelli and
Li 2002).
The way we estimate the liquidity synergy accruing to the acquirers of less liquid targets
is via accounting for the toehold appreciation taking place in gone private targets, due to
differences in stock liquidity. At the squeeze-out stage, the last stage of a going private trans-
action, bidders already in a position of significant toeholds in target stock offer compensation
to minority shareholders, with the intention to remove it from the exchange. To the degree
that stocks are not perfectly liquid, higher toeholds can feed into additional target stock
illiquidity, further alleviating incoming bidding contestants and increasing the probability of
bidding success. In this paper, liquidity transfer from a bidder on the valuation of its toehold
in less liquid target stock is identified as a toehold synergy, on top of the bid premium and the
increased probability of a successful deal outcome (Shleifer and Vishny 1986; Maug 2006).
The mechanics of this transfer are described in the following paragraphs.
The valuation of toeholds in illiquid target stock before the squeeze-out deal’s consum-
mation, although hard to value correctly (Mehran and Peristiani 2010), reflects the target’s
illiquidity discount. Following a successful going private deal, toeholds of gone private tar-
gets are valued by investors with a unique liquidity discount imposed on the theoretical value
of bidder assets. Hence, the double discounting reduces to a much inferior single one for
acquirers with more liquid stock than their targets. In effect, successful squeeze-out bidders
enjoy analogous benefits to the resolutions of negative stub values (Cochrane 2004), albeit
in the opposite direction: instead of resolving the subsidiary’s overvaluation via a spin off,
they remove their subsidiary’s undervaluation due to illiquidity by squeezing it out.
To account for liquidity transfer, we analyze, from the maximization of bidder shareholder
valuation perspective, the pro forma synergies before the public announcement of a freeze-
out merger or tender offer. The upper limit of an economically sound offer, allowing for the
absence of a control premium, consists of the target’s fair value plus synergies. Assuming the
target has NT outstanding shares, it is shown in the “Appendix” that the Law of One Price
decomposes the parent’s market capitalization before the offering takes place V B/UP RE to the
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value TVPre of its toehold α ∈ (0, 1) in the target and the stub value of the rest of its assets
VSA:
V B/UP RE  T V Pre + V S A  a(1 − d P )(1 − dT )PPr eT h N T + (1 − d P )V S AB P I (1)
where dP and dT represent the market liquidity discounts from their theoretical values of
parent and target stocks and V S AB P I is the theoretical stub value, consisting of the value
of bidder assets other than the toehold, before liquidity discounting. Until the final deal
consummation and the eventual target delisting, the valuation of the toehold experiences a
double liquidity discount, as an individual stock from its theoretical value and as part of the
parent’s assets. The reason for the double discounting lies in the concept of downward sloping
stock demand curves (Loderer and Jacobs 1995; Shleifer 1986; Wurgler and Zhuravskaya
2002). The toehold’s double liquidity discount reflects the alternative stock demand and
supply curves between target and bidder stock. There exists theoretical and empirical support
for the existence of double liquidity discounts in, e.g., closed-end funds vis-à-vis the discount
of the fund versus the illiquidity of its stock holdings (Cherkes et al. 2009).
Taking the target private entails a successful tender offer or statutory merger at a price of
PTO for its remaining (1 − α) shares, paying a premium of PPrem on the target’s theoretical
price PPr eT h :
PT O  PPr eT h + PPr em (2)
After being delisted, the full target value, which includes the pre-bid toehold and the
squeezed-out shareholding, integrates with the acquirer’s market capitalization. Netting
other synergies out and assuming the same parent liquidity discount, its stub value remains
unchanged. However, two reappraising effects price the toehold: first, the final acquisition
premium paid and, second, the acquirer’s post-squeeze-out liquidity discount. Taking into
consideration the expected liquidity discount of the parent E
[
d P ′
]
following a successful
deal consummation, the toehold registers a revaluation amounting to the difference between
its value before and after the deal4:
(3)
T V Post − T V Pr e
 aN T
{
PPr eT h (d P − E
[
d P ′
]
) + PPr eT h dT + PPr em(1 − d P
′ ) − PPr eT h d P dT
}
In this expression four sources of added value can be identified, inside the brackets. The first
term, representing the parent’s long-term liquidity evolution, is positive for an improvement
resulting from a thinner discount. The second term represents the margin of value stemming
from the acquirer’s liquidity transferred onto the target’s stock, which is greater for more
illiquid targets. The third term is the premium driven reappraisal and the fourth a second-
order term in the two stock liquidity discounts. The second term quantifies the positive role
of liquidity transfer’s effect on the toehold’s reappraisal over and above the effect of the
premium. It can directly contribute to a net gain in the parent’s market capitalization, to the
degree the premium paid leaves room for a positive reappraisal.
The net value added NVAA to the acquirer break-up valuation, following a successful
freeze-out, is estimated in the theoretical appendix as:
4 Detailed calculations can be found in a theoretical appendix posted on the authors’ personal website.
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Fig. 1 Liquidity transferring’s
theoretical worth per dollar of
toehold market value over
liquidity difference and parent
illiquidity. dT P  dT − d P .
ΔdTP : difference in target’s
versus bidder’s stock illiquidity
discount, dP : parent’s stock
illiquidity discount, LiqTransf :
theoretical liquidity transferring’s
worth per dollar of toehold
market value
ΔdTP d
P
N V AA 
⎧⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎨
⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎩
d P (V S AB P I + N T PPr eT h )
+dT P N T αPPr eT h (1 − d P )
−N T PPr eT h
[(α − d P ) − α(1 − d) − α(1 − d P )2]
+N T PPr em(d P − d P + α)
−cT
(4)
In this expression, dT P  dT − d P is the initial liquidity difference between the parent
and the subsidiary stock, d P  d P −d P ′ is the parent stock’s expected long-run illiquidity
improvement following the squeeze-out, and cT represents the transaction’s legal, investment
banking, and operational expenses. Among the alternative sources of net value addition and
subtraction to the acquirer, the second term represents liquidity transfer LiqTransf , which
can be written as a function of the target’s market price PPr eT g before the deal announcement
as follows:
LiqT rans f  dT P N T αPPr eT h (1 − d P )  dT P N T αPPr eT g (1 − dT )(1 − d P ) (5)
Considering that dT P  dT − d P , expression (5) can be written as a nonlinear function
of liquidity discounts and differences as follows:
LiqT rans f  N T αPPr eT g
[
dT P (1 − d P )2 −
(
dT P
)2
(1 − d P )
]
(6)
Figure 1 exhibits this nonlinear relation between the hypothetical LiqTransf and a parent’s
illiquidity dP and the liquidity differences between the two stocks ΔdTP. The vertical axis
measures the standardized, by toehold value N T αPPr eT g , percentage contribution of liquidity
transfer’s value LiqTransf . The maximum possible liquidity transferring contribution of 25%
is attained at zero parent illiquidity and a positive 50% illiquidity difference. The influence
of ΔdTP on liquidity transfer’s added value is not monotonic. Although a positive ΔdTP is
a prerequisite for a positive contribution of liquidity transfer, its overall impact depends on
the interplay with the parent’s illiquidity discount dP.
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The acquirer stock illiquidity dP, according to our formulation for liquidity transfer, has
an overall negative impact on the net value added5 when squeezing out illiquid targets.
Intuitively more liquid, lower dP, parents dispose of a larger margin of liquidity difference
to transfer to their targets after the deal consummation, delivering superior added value. This
leads to the following hypothesis:
Hypothesis 1 The more liquid the parent stock before the deal announcement, the higher
the expected added value derived from transferring liquidity onto the gone private toehold.
With respect to the parent stock’s long-run liquidity improvement ΔdP, existing empirical
evidence on US mergers and tender offers supports a measurable effect. Lee and Chung (2013)
indicate it is more profound in mergers rather than tender offers, with targets exhibiting a
superior long-run liquidity upgrading to their bidders. In our theoretical analysis, acquirers’
long-run illiquidity improvement dP can be a significant factor, as a multiplier of the
full theoretical acquirer value in expression (4). Hence, to the degree that there exists an
anticipated long run liquidity improvement, it is expected to play a role in deal economics.
2.2 Liquidity transfer in abnormal returns
If liquidity transfer is an important economic factor, to the extent the market believes it can
add value to the bidder, the latter’s abnormal returns on deal announcement can be related
to its anticipated effect. Its relative expected magnitude on deal announcement day t= 0
is empirically estimated using the expectation of expression (5), which, after dropping the
expectation operator, is standardized for deal size by dividing it by the premium paid:
LiqT rans f
Pr emium
 d
T P N T αPPr eT g (1 − dT )(1 − d P )
N T (1 − α) PT O 
dT PαPPr eT g (1 − dT )(1 − d P )
(1 − α) PT O
(7)
This standardized expression is an approximation of the expected contribution of liquidity
transfer per dollar of equity premium. The higher this ratio, the more important the role of
liquidity transfer in deal economics.
How is bidder CAR influenced by the relative liquidities of parent versus target stock?
Assuming the deal is consummated immediately after its announcement, the expected bidder
abnormal return EP(CAR) is estimated, taking the expected net added value from (4) and
dividing it by the pre-deal break-up valuation from expression (1):
E P (C AR) 
⎧⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎨
⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎩
d P
(
V S AB P I + P
Pre
T h N
T )
+P PreT h N
T αdT P
(
1 − d P)
−P PreT h N T
[(
α − d P) − α (1 − d P)2
]
+P Prem N T
(
d P − d P + α)
−cT
⎫⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎬
⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎭
(
1 − d P) V S AB P I + α
(
1 − d P) (1 − dT P + d P) P PreT h N T
(8)
On the empirical side, bidder CAR is typically estimated with a method suggested by
Malatesta (1983) and employed in BLL, which isolates the share of bidder abnormal returns
5 For plausible values, the first dP partial derivative of expression (4) is negative. The condition for negativity
is V
B/U
P RE
T V Pre <
5−4d P
1−dT , which is met for toehold values greater than a fourth of the parent’s value, assuming the
parent stock liquidity discount is less than 25%.
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due to its own underlying assets, by subtracting the appreciation of its toehold in target shares.
The adjustment on bidder CAR suggested by BLL subtracts the percentage of value change
represented from the toehold α in the target, according to the following formulations, which
provide the empirical counterpart of expression (8):
Ad justed Bidder C AR  Bidder(AMV ) − a × T arget(AMV )
Bidder PreBid (MV ) − a × T arget PreBid (MV ) (9)
where:
Bidder (AMV )  Bidder pre-bid MV × BidderC AR
T arget (AMV )  T arget pre-bid MV × T argetC AR
}
(10)
In expression (10), Δ(AMV ) represents the difference in abnormal market values (AMV) for
bidder and target, adjusted by their [T−2] pre-bid market values MV.
Assuming a conservative zero expected long-run parent liquidity improvement (ΔdP 0)
upon deal announcement and adjusting (8) according to (9), (10) is simplified as follows:
E Pad j (C AR0) 
⎧⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎨
⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎩
dT P N T α(1 − d P )
−P PreT h N T [(α − d P ) − α(1 − d P )2]
−d P P Prem N T
−cT
⎫⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎬
⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎭
(1 − d P )V S AB P I + α(1 − d P )(1 − dT P + d P )P PreT h N T
(11)
The first term on the nominator is the expected liquidity transferring in expression (5),
depicting its positive theoretical relation with the parent’s expected CAR. Notably, a non-
linear relation exists between E Pad j (C AR0) and both parent versus target pre-deal liquidity
difference ΔTP and pre-deal parent liquidity discount dP. In fact, for positive parent stub
values before the deal announcement, CAR0 is a nonlinear function of the former, as can be
seen from the first partial derivative with respect to liquidity difference estimated as
∂ E Pad j (C AR0)
∂dT P

α
V S AB P I
N T P PreT h
+ α2
(
1 + d P
) −
[
(α−d P)
(1−d P) −α
]
N T P PreT h[
V S AB P I
N T P PreT h
+ α
(
1 − dT P + d P)
]2 (12)
The relation with pre-deal parent liquidity is also nonlinear. Employing L’Hôspital’s rule,
the partial derivative with respect to dP tends to the nonlinear function
2α− P Prem
P PreT h
dT P−2d P−2 . The
subtracted term d P P Prem N T represents the depreciation on the bidder’s capitalization fol-
lowing the full acquisition of the target on the premium paid due to its own liquidity discount.
It is subtracted as a negative liquidity synergy from the bidder’s market value.
Based on the above, the bidder CAR is nonlinearly related with its own stock liquidity and
its margin of difference from its subsidiary target. However, the critical liquidity difference
covariate is affected by a number of variables and can be endogenous. On the basis of the
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existing empirical findings (Bates et al. 2006; Lee and Chung 2013) a vector X of variables can
affect bidder CAR, including target price run-up, relative size and book to market ratios, the
target’s leverage, the series of dummies reflecting the legal setting described above, the deal
offer type, and the target’s price. Hence, the empirical estimation can be performed through
the following system of equations, instrumented via a matrix I of exogenous instruments,
which in our calculation includes year dummies and liquidity risk (Perrakis and Zhong
2017):
E Pad j (C AR0)  c + β1d P + β2 d
T P
1−β3dT P + β4d
T P + βX + γI + u
dT P  ζX + κI + v
⎫
⎬
⎭ (13)
3 Empirical methods
3.1 Infrequent trading and liquidity proxies
The sample of squeezed-out firms involves targets whose vast majority of shares are with-
held from the controlling bidders, rendering their stock trading duly thin and infrequent.
To estimate returns and the associated liquidity proxies under thin trading, the event study
adjustment proposed by Maynes and Rumsey (1993) is undertaken. Besides thin trading,
liquidity’s notorious elusiveness (Kyle 1985) necessitates employing a variety of proxies
to gauge both friction and immediacy cost for acquirer and target shares before and after
a successful deal consummation. The daily price and volume data in the sample allows
estimation of a variety of low frequency liquidity proxies to capture price impact, cost
of trading, and trading activity. Price impact measures include Amihud’s ILLIQ (Amihud
2002), which links trading volume with transaction cost in a manner related to Kyle’s (1985)
lambda, and Amivest (Cooper et al. 1985), a practitioners’ favorite (Goyenko et al. 2009).
Price impact is also measured with Gamma (Pastor and Stambaugh 2003), which estimates
the regression coefficient of volume-driven return reversals. Nonparametric illiquidity mea-
sures, including run length (Das and Hanouna 2010), are also used in unreported robustness
tests.
Cost-related measures include the relative spread (Amihud and Mendelson 1986), which
is one of the simpler proxies, and Roll’s impact (Roll 1984), which estimates the effective
price spread based on the serial covariance of price changes. In addition, LOT (Lesmond et al.
1999) estimates the effective spread, breaking the sample up into informed and zero return
non-informative days and FHT (Fong et al. 2011), which simplifies and improves LOT, albeit
with a high correlation to Kyle’s lambda. Trading activity is measured with the turnover ratio
(Datar et al. 1998), based on the number of traded shares.
The proxies employed conclude with option-based models, including Longstaff and
Schwartz (2001) upper bound of the opportunity cost for missing the ability to liquidate
stocks in the market for both regularly and thinly traded stocks. Chacko et al.’s (2008) cost
of immediacy, estimated under the extreme scenario of a bidder deciding to liquidate the
entire target toehold in the marketplace, sets an alternative upper bound for liquidity cost.
The return adjustments for thin trading are performed for those proxies involving stock
returns.
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3.2 Implied options calculation
The moment the formal announcement of a bidding offer takes place, the value of the target
stock in the trading session incorporates the option to participate in the cash or stock exchange.
Following Bhagat et al. (1987), the prevailing market price P F BMkt immediately following the
bid announcement is constituted from the underlying theoretical value of the firm P F BT h plus
a put value P Put , which incorporates the offered terms:
P F BMkt  P F BT h + (1 − α)P Put (14)
The factor (1−α) represents the percentage sought in the bid, namely the remaining
non-toehold outstanding target shares. Two distinctive modeling approaches are pursued
accordingly, distinctive for each of the exchange mediums offered. For cash offers, the existing
literature (Bhagat et al. 1987; Sudarsanam and Sorwar 2010) assumes that volatility is non-
stochastic, and the implied European put to sell the stock at the offered price is modeled
based on the Black and Scholes (1973) formula.
In this paper, for cash offers, a stochastic volatility framework is performed following
Heston and Nandi’s (2000) assumption of a GARCH(1, 1) underlying data generation process
for the stock price plus interest and dividends. The price at time t of a European put with strike
price K expiring at time T on an underlying stock with price P F BT h (t) is estimated employing
the put-call parity and Heston and Nandi’s (2000) price for a European call with stochastic
volatility, as follows:
PutCash 
⎧⎪⎪⎪⎪⎨
⎪⎪⎪⎪⎩
− 12 P F BT h (t) + 12 K e−r (T −t)
− 1
π
K e−r (T −t)
∞∫
0
Re
[
K −iϕ f ∗(iϕ)
iϕ
]
dϕ
+ e
−r(T −t)
π
∞∫
0
Re
[
K −iϕ f ∗(iϕ+1)
iϕ
]
dϕ
⎫⎪⎪⎪⎪⎬
⎪⎪⎪⎪⎭
(15)
where f*(ϕ) is the characteristic function. The estimation of the put price is performed recur-
sively from the terminal values to the current asset price, employing numerical integration.
The put price depends on the current stock underlying price P F BT h (t) and its volatility path
h(t+Δ), which is a function of current and lagged asset prices.
For stock offers, a Margrabe-type (1978) American exchange option is estimated for the
additional benefit delivered from the parent to the target shareholders to deliver their stock
and receive bidder shares. The formulation follows Bjerksund and Stensland (1993) for the
evaluation of the right to exchange accruing to target shareholders. Assuming that, following
the bidding announcement, the parent stock P F BPar and target’s underlying value P
F B
T h follow
geometric Brownian motions, in an efficient market the value of the exchange option PutExch
at the time t= 0 is derived as follows6:
Put Exch  E∗0
[
e−r t g
(
P F BPar (t), P F BT h (t), t
)]
 F(P F BT h , P F BPar , r − dtgt , T, dpar − dtgt , σ 212) (16)
with E∗0 [] denoting the risk-adjusted probability measures’ expectation at time 0, written as a
function F() of an American put option with strike price P F BT h ; of the current underlying asset,
which is the parent’s price P F BPar times the offer’s exchange ratio; of the riskless rate r − dtgt ,
which is derived as the risk-free interest rate minus the target’s dividend yield; of the time to
6 The reader is referred to Bjerksund and Stensland’s (1993) paper for the analytic formulae.
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maturity T until the offer’s announced expiration date; of a risk-adjusted drift dpar − dtgt ;
and of the volatility σ 212, estimated as the covariance between parent’s and target’s stock.
A conservative estimate of the target’s value implied in the put plus underlying theoretical
stock portfolio is derived. Exchange options become more expensive the lower the value of
the asset exchanged and the higher the value of the asset received. In the pursued formulation,
the less valuable target’s theoretical underlying value is delivered against the more valuable
parent’s market value of the offered exchange ratio.
The method to estimate equity underlying value, adjusting market prices for the exchange
or the cash offer implied options, is based on the formulation suggested by Bhagat et al.
(1987). Because neither the underlying value nor its volatility is directly observable, an
indirect estimation based on stock market prices which reflect the value of the portfolio of
the put Puti plus its underlying stock values is performed. Following Sudarsanam and Sorwar
(2010), the following quadratic tolerance function is minimized, subject to a one cent price
limit:
(
P F BMkt − P F BT h − (1 − α)Puti
)2  0 with i  Cash, Exch (17)
Our estimation method for cash deals is quite distinctive from Bhagat et al.’s (1987) or
Sudarsanam and Sorwar’s (2010). Their algorithm converges if the volatility of the derived
underlying price’s time series throughout the post announcement period is equal to the realized
volatility before the deal announcement. This is the restriction we impose for algorithm
convergence in exchange deals for the covariance between the underlying equity price and
parent’s stock. However, for cash offers, because volatility is estimated herein as a GARCH(1,
1) process with parameters estimated from the sequence of target market prices preceding the
deal announcement, it should be mean reverting to the historical long-run variance. Hence,
the GARCH(1, 1) long-run variance parameters are maintained as in the period before the
deal. Bhagat et al.’s (1987) constant volatility is relaxed and the mean reverting property of
the underlying equity’s volatility is utilized instead. The minimization objective is to find the
minimum underlying price satisfying the tolerance function (21). Because volatility plays
the role of a return risk premium in Heston and Nandi’s (2000) formulation, minimizing the
underlying stock price underlies the maximization of conditional volatility, albeit with the
added restriction of reversion to its long-run mean.
The estimation algorithm minimizes the tolerance function for each trading day with
a random search minimization algorithm which generates different starting points, one of
which is the historical pre-announcement price and/or the realized volatility. The global non-
zero minimum price is obtained by taking the lesser of all of the estimated minima derived
from the random starting points within a fixed percentage neighborhood (Gilli and Schumann
2012). Of 22 deals, one of which is a short-form merger in cash and 21 of which are stock
or mixed offers, the algorithm fails to converge in at least one of the three deal-window
days. In these cases, the unadjusted for implied options market prices are employed for CAR
estimation. Overall, the difference between the market price and the minimum underlying
equity is expected to drive a wedge between the existing literature’s reported target CAR and
our more conservative option-adjusted estimates (OACAR).
3.3 Probability of moneyness
The moneyness of the estimated put option granted to the target’s minority shareholders, i.e.
the extent to which the offering price exceeds the target’s underlying value on the offer’s
expiration date, is an important deal parameter (Borochin 2014). In acquisitions other than
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squeeze-outs, the higher the option’s moneyness, the higher the market’s expectations that
minorities shall receive, in the deal’s due course, reappraised premiums due to synergies or
overbidding (Bhagat et al. 1987). However, synergies have a distinctively different role in
squeeze-out deals. In Amihud et al. (2004) theoretical model for US freeze-outs, the deal
concludes if the tender price exceeds by any positive margin the pre-offer target market
price. The rule they propose for successful and efficient bid conclusion is to deliver to non-
tendering shareholders the maximum between the offering and pre-tender target’s trading
price. This rule suggests that a necessary and sufficient condition for successful squeeze-outs
is the valuation of the target to acquirers to exceed bidding costs plus the value of the target
under incumbent management. According to Amihud et al. (2004) rule, liquidity transfer
can act as a catalyst for successful deals without a commensurate increase in the offered
premium. Notwithstanding that for cash bids minority shareholders are entitled, through
Delaware court fair valuation procedure, to any target-specific synergies, bidders do not
need to include liquidity transfer. This is because any benefit dependent upon taking the
company from public to private status or depending upon specific acquirer characteristics,
such as stock liquidity, cannot be counted in Subramanian (2007). As a result, the presence
of liquidity transfer synergy in cash offers should be associated with underbidding, i.e. the
increased probability the offering price falls short of the target’s underlying value driving the
put option’s moneyness Out of The Money (OTM).
Madan et al. (2008) develop a mathematical formulation for the distribution of a European
put option’s moneyness. According to their formulation, moneyness is defined as the put
option price forwarded to its expiration date and divided by the similarly forwarded underlying
stock price for a relative strike given by the original option’s strike divided by the same
forwarded underlying stock price. They derive it as the ratio of the estimated put price
P Put forwarded to the expiration date T over the likewise forwarded strike, which for our
purposes is the offering price PTO, in a Black–Scholes-Merton framework.7 Their derivation
assumes a process for the moneyness of a stock and the relative moneyness of the fixed strike
over the forwarded theoretical time zero underlying stock value with dividend yield q and
prevailing interest rates r. The authors show that puts divided by their strike are distribution
functions of their strikes and maturities. Employing the Black-Merton-Scholes formulation,
the distribution of moneyness as a function of maturity, relativized by its strike, is derived as
follows:
(18)
P Put
(
PT O
P F BT h,0e(r−q)T
, T
)
PT O
P F BT h,0e(r−q)T
 N
⎛
⎜⎝
ln PT O
P F BT h,0e(r−q)T
σ
√
T
+
σ
√
T
2
⎞
⎟⎠
− 1
PT O
P F BT h,0e(r−q)T
N
⎛
⎜⎝
ln PT O
P F BT h,0e(r−q)T
σ
√
T
− σ
√
T
2
⎞
⎟⎠
Employing Madan et al. (2008) results, we use this probability distribution to estimate the
moneyness process for the squeeze-out puts granted to minority shareholders. As can be seen
from (18), overbids, i.e. higher PTO as a percentage of the underlying forwarded theoretical
target value PFETh , underlie a greater value for the shareholder put and an increased probability
7 Certain assumptions are required for the moneyness process. It has to be a positive local martingale under
the risk neutral probability P with respect to its natural filtration F  (Ft , t ≥0), to have no positive jumps,
and to tend to zero at infinity. Readers can refer to Madan Roynette and Yor’s (2008) original article for the
mathematical derivations.
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the put gets In The Money (ITM). The degree to which liquidity transfer synergy can affect
this probability is further examined. To the extent competitors, alongside other synergies,
force the bidder to price it in the tender offer price, the probability of overbidding increases.
However, in the case the bidder does not count liquidity transfer in, the tender offer price as
a percentage of the underlying theoretical value should stay unaffected and the probability
of overbidding is subdued.
4 Data and summary statistics
The freeze-out deals involving US listed gone private targets from worldwide listed parents
between 1990 and the end of 2014 are identified using the SDC database. The search term
applied is “acquisitions of remaining interest” for US listed targets. Acquisitions from private
bidders are excluded, with the exception of those belonging to ultimately publicly quoted
holding companies. Each deal announcement is individually examined through Edgar (the
SEC website) to identify the specific details of the initial proposal, the dates and terms of any
amendments, and other firm and deal characteristics, including outstanding shares, exchange
ratio, and offer price. The SDC database list is also crosschecked with public sources (Dow
Jones news) to establish the accuracy and sequence in the development of the public offer
terms. After removing the uncompleted or withdrawn offers by the end of 2014, a sample of
162 freeze-outs is obtained. Annual accounting and daily price data for the listed companies
are obtained from Bloomberg.
Table 1 summarizes for each of the 25 deal-years the total number of deals, broken down by
those initiated from non-US listed parent ultimate holding companies, cash or stock offerings,
and the days taken to complete the delisting. In the following columns several deal parameters
are reported for both counterparties. The percentage of a target’s shares in the parent’s toehold
and selected ratios, including the natural logarithm of market capitalization (Size), book to
market value (BMV), and debt over equity (Debt/Equity), are estimated based on the 251-day
average price in the period ending 42 trading days before the deal announcement8 and the
most recent annual accounting data before the first offering’s announcement.
The sample comprises, excluding the Genentech-Roche $40 billion mega deal, an aggre-
gate initial offer equity purchase consideration of $60.9 billion. The summary statistics point
to chronic subdued growth as a reason for parent companies taking their targets private
(Bharath and Dittmar 2010). Equivalently, smaller target size (Bharath and Dittmar 2010)
and lower leverage, hinting at free cash flow agency problems (Lehn and Poulsen 1989), drive
parents to take their targets private. The ratio of cash to stock offerings is biased towards
cash, with a ratio of 2–1, in line with the squeeze-out literature (Subramanian 2007). Regard-
ing bidder origin, cross-border freeze-outs represent only 23.3% of the deals, initiated from
bidders directly or ultimately owned via non-US holding companies. The average parent toe-
hold is 68% of the target’s outstanding shares and the median equity consideration initially
offered is $75.30 million, amended 4% upwards to conclude the deal. Only ten cases include
toeholds with a controlling interest of less than 50%, three of them with less than 25%. Eleven
deals are short-form mergers with bidders holding more than 89.5% of the target before the
transaction.
The liquidity characteristics of the counterparties are shown in Table 2. The sample con-
sists of duly illiquid targets relative to their acquirers, justifying the closer look at liquidity
8 This adjustment is in line with BLL’s suggestion to control for the possibility of a higher ex-ante expectation
of a forthcoming squeeze-out bid.
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differences in successful bids. Approximately one in three bidder stocks exhibits some period
of non-trading, eight of them missing more than 10 days in a 252-day trading year. The sit-
uation with the targets is more acute, with 145 firms, or 89.5% of the sample, experiencing
some non-trading, two thirds of them missing in excess of ten trading days in a year. The
mean target stock illiquidity before the deal announcement ranges from 1.26, for the LOT
proxy, to 142.86, for the Amivest, times higher than its listed bidder’s. This significant mar-
gin of liquidity disparity is reasonable for the majority of squeeze-outs involving parents
already holding a substantial toehold in the target, alluding to a liquidity-driven downward
sloping demand stock curve (Loderer and Jacobs 1995; Wurgler and Zhuravskaya 2002). An
intensive discrepancy is also witnessed in comparing alternative liquidity proxies’ historical
volatility, which appears universally higher in the target. The ratio of target over parent illiq-
uidity ranges from 1.65 to 87.34.9 With very few exceptions, the liquidity proxies portray
non-Gaussian distributions, mostly positively skewed with significant kurtosis. In unreported
results, available from the authors upon request, the breakdown of liquidity proxy statistics
by alternative deal offering type underlies no significant difference between cash and stock
offers for the target versus parent illiquidity.
5 Results
5.1 Liquidity transfer’s magnitude and scarcity of target stock
To make clear how important the added value derived from liquidity transfer is, we estimate
its contribution for each specific deal via the standardized expression (7). In line with the
existing literature, we resort to alternative liquidity proxies to help us ascertain the magnitude
and direction of its influence. Mean and median statistics of the expected net value added from
liquidity transfer for different liquidity proxies10 by offering type are reported in Table 3.
The estimated value of liquidity transfer is positive in the vast majority of the cases and for
most liquidity proxies, including the small sample of mixed offers.
The point estimate for median liquidity transfer is positive and higher for cash offers. Its
median contribution to parent value, measured with Chacko proxy, for stock and cash deals
safely covers the 1.5 million average investment banking fees for equivalently sized US deals
(Calomiris and Hitscherich 2007). Notably, in two cash and eight stock deals by RelSprd,
and five cash and eleven stock deals by Chacko, liquidity transfer’s estimated contribution
sufficiently covers the initial premium offered, suggesting a decisive role in deal economics.
The stock market environment can be conducive to or prohibitive for generating value to the
bidder via liquidity transfer. A critical factor is the prevalence of a downward sloping demand
curve for the target’s stock, evidence of a volume return relation (Loderer and Jacobs 1995;
Shleifer 1986; Wurgler and Zhuravskaya 2002). Liquidity transfer’s added value exists insofar
as the demand curve flattens by shifting from the target’s to the bidder’s liquidity profile. A
direct way to expose the existence of such a relation is to examine whether liquidity underlies
the availability of shares in the market. In this case, bidders facing downward demand curves
in the target’s secondary market before a squeeze-out can increase target stock illiquidity
by purchasing, i.e. removing, some additional target shares from the market. Even if the
9 The volatility ratio of target over parent Turno proxy, which measures liquidity, appears less than unity.
However, with a Taylor expansion of the inverse Turno, the ratio of target over parent illiquidity is 3.25.
10 In unreported results, available from the authors upon request, only two of the liquidity transfer estimates
with alternative liquidity proxies are strongly correlated, namely Amivest with Amih.
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bidder’s sole intention is to obtain a controlling toehold, higher target illiquidity means a
cheaper stock if liquidity is priced. Both the added value derived from liquidity transfer and
a favorable deal outcome, via the intimidation of prospective arbitrageurs, is facilitated.
Table 4 reports the results of simultaneous centile regressions for ten of the liquidity
proxies between the two extreme 33 and 67% centiles, determined by target stock turnover,
on the toehold. The two extreme centiles for every proxy are chosen to portray the differ-
ential impact of higher versus lower illiquidity on the parent. Should more illiquid targets,
carrying a higher capacity to their acquirers from liquidity transferring, experience steeper
demand curves, there is an obvious incentive to amass a higher toehold vis-à-vis an ultimate
intention to freeze out. The regressions employ a number of control variables to minimize
the effect of confounders and missing covariates. The relative book to market value of the
target’s over parent’s stock (RELBMV), the debt to equity ratio (DBTEQ), the relative size
between the bidder and the target (RELSIZE), a dummy for the years following the Siliconix
decision (SILCX), a dummy for Thermo-Electron deals (THERMO), another for short-form
mergers (SHFM), another for companies with negative equity (NEGEQ), a dummy for cash
(CASH1) or stock offers (CASH0), and the natural logarithm of the deal duration in
days are included. Results from 1000 Monte Carlo bootstrap resampling indicate that the
option-based liquidity proxies Chacko and Lonsgt have a direct positive relation with the
toehold size at a significance level of α = 0.001, and, marginally, Turno and AdjAmih at a
α = 0.10 level. The point estimates for the toehold coefficient show a dependence of illiquidity
on the amount of free-floating shares across liquidity proxies, with the exception of one proxy
(FHT). Although only the Chacko proxy exhibits a statistically significant higher estimate of
sensitivity with the toehold size in the more versus less illiquid centile, the majority of point
estimates corroborate the inequality. Hence, this is fertile ground for affecting liquidity via
reducing the availability of target shares.
The other source of liquidity synergies, according to our analysis, is the potential long-run
improvement in acquirer stock liquidity. In unreported results, available from the authors upon
request, median sample illiquidity improvement statistics support a statistically significant
long-run improvement in parent liquidity across all deal types, stronger for stock offers. Our
findings confirm a positive long-run effect of parent illiquidity improvement on bidder value
and evidence that its anticipated positive synergy is factored into bidder price upon the deal’s
announcement.
5.2 Generated Cumulative Abnormal Returns
To analyze the economic rents generated on deal announcement, the implied option-adjusted
underlying target’s value CAR (OACAR) versus the non-adjusted values are compared to
expose the utility of the suggested adjustment. The former registers the effects on the target’s
underlying equity of new information revealed about a bidder’s offer relative to the target’s
fair value and the possibility of upward bid revision(s). The latter includes the claim that
target shareholders have against the bidding firm derived from the put option offered. The
discrepancy between the market CAR and OACAR, both estimated with Scholes-Williams
betas, appears significant between the summary statistics reported on Table 5. The former
register a positive mean and median target CAR of 14.54 and 11.61%, while the option-
adjusted statistics are 3.26 and 0.18%, respectively.11 The equality between the observed
and OACAR figures is rejected at the α = 0.001 level of significance, with nonparametric
11 Cases where there is either no convergence in the option adjustment algorithm or there is convergence to
a degree not significantly different than zero underlying price at the α = 0.05 level are excluded.
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Wilcoxon signed-rank tests for the whole sample and the individual stock and cash deal
subsamples. The apparent discrepancy between the two figures reveals the importance of
the put option offered in squeeze-out economics, underlying more than 11.28% out of the
14.54% average target unadjusted CAR. Notably, the existing squeeze-out empirical literature
(e.g. Bates et al. 2006; Lee and Chung 2013) mostly ignores this important implied options
adjustment in estimating target CAR.
For the cross-sectional tests of CAR, Cowan’s (1992) nonparametric sign test is con-
ducted, as suggested by Maynes and Rumsey (1993), for interpreting the thin trading return
adjustments. The average adjusted CAR for parent stock, employing Eq. (11), the empiri-
cal counterpart of Eq. (9), which excludes toehold appreciation due to the bid premium, is
reported in the left column of Table 5. Bidder average adjusted CAR is negative (-5.39%),
but insignificantly different from zero, whereas the median is statistically significantly nega-
tive (-0.74%). The wide variation between mean and median underlies a significant negative
skewness in our US squeeze-out sample. A part of the adjusted bidder CAR is represented by
the positive liquidity transfer synergies explained in Eq. (9). Although liquidity transfer can
mitigate the market’s negative reaction, it does not on average reverse the negative sign of
bidder adjusted CAR, although it can still have an important positive contribution to bidder
returns.
Similar to the existing findings of BLL and Lee and Chung (2013), squeeze-out targets
in our sample register a statistically significant positive mean observed CAR of 14.54%.
However, the mean target OACAR amounts to less than a quarter of that, registering 3.26%.
The nearly 20% margin of difference between mean adjusted bidder CAR and target observed
CAR is diminished by comparing medians and OACAR. In terms of medians, target CAR
is 11.61% and OACAR is an insignificantly different than zero 0.18%, rendering its margin
from median-adjusted bidder CAR less than 1%. Overall, both from the bidder and target
side, we find compelling evidence for the dependence of market expected returns on toehold
appreciation.
The table is further split by medium of exchange to test the disparity of bidder versus
target abnormal returns between cash and stock deals. The higher the cash content, the lower
the bidder returns and the greater the disparity between bidder and target CAR and OACAR.
Stock offers exhibit a median negative (-0.78%) bidder CAR, and median negative (-0.22%)
target OACAR, not significantly different from zero. Cash offers register a negative median
bidder CAR, and a positive median 1.34% target OACAR, respectively. Mixed offers display
a positive 1.84% median parent CAR and a median negative (-28.23) target CAR.12 Overall,
the market receives more positive cash deal announcements for targets versus bidders, and
stock deals leave market participants indifferent irrespective of the medium offered The
literature purports that the higher frequency of cash versus stock offers in squeeze-outs is
either due to the fact that minority shareholders can receive cash more quickly (Subramanian
2007) or because bidders wish to signal their confidence in their assessment of target value
(Fishman 1989) and the valuation of their own stock (Eckbo and Thorburn 2000). The option-
adjusted analysis provides a straightforward ratification of the latter, pinpointing that cash
bid higher median returns underlie target value rather than bidder inertia.
The target illiquidity can shed additional light on the drivers of abnormal returns. The
sample is divided into three illiquidity centiles by target turnover ratio, with results, for
the most illiquid, reported in the middle column, and for the most liquid, or least illiquid,
in the right-hand column of Table 5. When comparing the centiles we see that the bidder
median-adjusted CAR is not significantly different than zero for both target extreme illiquidity
12 OACAR is not estimated for mixed offers.
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samples. In contrast, the more liquid the target stock, the higher the target median OACAR,
of 1.58% (versus -1.42%). Market participants expect an increased premium on freeze-
out announcements for more illiquid targets, although for bidders there is no statistically
significantly different from zero abnormal announcement return. Hence, although bidders
in squeeze-outs fail to capture the liquidity premium, in line with Massa and Xu’s (2013)
findings, market participants do not penalize them with negative returns, possibly due to
liquidity transfer’s contribution to bidder returns.
We next focus on the alternative means of payment between alternative target illiquidity
centiles. The median OACAR of less liquid targets’ shareholders is statistically significantly
lower in cash offers only. This can underlie an expectation of a lower premium revision, due to
the absence of arbitrageurs (Jindra and Walking 2004). However, the bidder’s choice of stock
versus cash is not returning statistically significantly different OACAR between illiquidity
centiles, on the basis of a two sample nonparametric equality of medians test. However, in
the most illiquid centile of target stock, the choice of stock is statistically significantly better
received than cash, registering a positive 1.43% median CAR versus a negative (-1.27%), at
the α = 0.05 level.
Why does the market receive the announcement of stock offers for the most illiquid targets
as better news for bidders than cash? Liquidity transfer in conjunction with bidder long-run
liquidity can offer a plausible explanation. The value added for the bidder, on the basis of our
theoretical analysis for liquidity transfer, increases for targets with a greater margin of stock
liquidity difference, which, coupled with its potential to bridge information asymmetry in
stock deals (Hansen 1987), can render equity the medium of choice.
To gauge the direct effects of target’s illiquidity on bidder adjusted CAR, we report a
series of Generalized Method of Moments (GMM) on the basis of Eq. (10) with alternative
estimation methods13 in Table 6. Liquidity and liquidity differences are estimated with all of
the employed liquidity proxies, but are reported with only Amih and RelSprd liquidity proxies
to save space, without qualitative differences. In the first two columns of Table 6, entitled
Panel A, the iterative GMM results are reported, employing year dummies and liquidity risk,
measured as the standard deviation of stock turnover ratio, as instruments.
In the next four columns, Panels B and C, results are based on the Taylor polynomial
expansion of the nonlinear term included in Eq. (10):
α
dT P
1 − βdT P 	 c1d
T P + c2
(
dT P
)2
+ c3
(
dT P
)3
+ c4
(
dT P
)4
(19)
The last two columns show results from the same formulation as in Panel B, with a reduced
set of covariates to facilitate convergence, estimated with the continuously updated GMM or
CUE of Hansen et al. (1996). The illiquidity difference between the target and its acquirer,
and its nonlinear terms, appear to be a consistently significant factor in the GMM results,
supporting the suggested nonlinear formulation (10). Across models, stock offers consis-
tently deliver a lower parent CAR versus cash. Relatively smaller targets generate greater
bidder CAR. Superior parent liquidity appears to deliver higher CAR to the bidder, in line
with the posited effect of liquidity transfer in Hypothesis 1. The estimated coefficients in the
13 Weak identification hampers nonlinear GMM estimators in samples of relatively smaller size (Stock et al.
2002). To overcome this difficulty and check the consistency of results, three alternative GMM approaches
are pursued. First, an iterative formulation according to Eq. (10); second, a third-order Taylor expansion of
the nonlinear term α d
T P
1−βdT P 	 c1d
T P + c2
(
dT P
)2
+ c3
(
dT P
)3
+ c4
(
dT P
)4
estimated with
two-stage GMM; and third, a reduced form with the same Taylor expansion polynomial estimated with Hansen
et al.’s (1996) continuously updated GMM estimator or CUE. Results for other liquidity proxies are consistent
with reported findings and are available from the authors upon request.
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Table 6 GMM estimation of Parent CAR on illiquidity
AdjAmih RelSprd AdjAmih RelSprd AdjAmih RelSprd
Panel A Panel B Panel C
Eq: CARP
ΔdTP 0.0722
(1.47)
0.0930
(0.67)
0.0908
(0.99)
0.290
(1.00)
−0.128
(−3.03)***
0.217
(2.41)*
β2 of
(
β2dT P
(1−β3dT P )
)
−0.468
(−0.59)
−0.340
(−0.25)
β3 of
(
β2dT P
(1−β3dT P )
)
−1.089
(2.228)
−2.354
(0.272)
dP 0.07
(−0.79)
0.02
(−4.33)***
5.460
(1.34)
4.484
(1.43)
−1.586
(−1.25)
3.915
(3.17)***
(
dT P
)2 −229.3
(−0.22)
−0.218
(−3.10)***
−8143.5
(−1.76)+
−0.129
(−3.14)***
(
dT P
)3
1717.1
(0.29)
0.0279
(0.57)
45227.2
(1.74)+
0.00223
(0.08)
(
dT P
)4
N −2978.1
(−0.35)
0.00289
(0.27)
−62228.0
(−1.71)+
0.00469
(0.80)
RELSIZE −0.334
(−1.47)
−0.00532
(−0.01)
−0.117
(−0.34)
0.354
(1.40)
0.892
(2.66)***
−0.0637
(−1.08)
RELBMV 0.00583
(0.81)
−0.00880
(−0.04)
0.00100
(0.54)
0.00148
(0.54)
DBTEQ −0.0188
(−0.54)
0.0474
(0.39)
−0.0243
(−0.98)
−0.0389
(−1.23)
INVPRCE −0.0203
(−0.09)
−0.220
(−0.34)
−0.102
(−0.55)
−0.488
(−1.40)
NEGEQ 0.0873
(0.34)
0.274
(0.18)
−0.120
(−0.98)
−0.0714
(−0.45)
SILCX −0.108
(−0.56)
0.00750
(0.02)
−0.107
(−1.03)
0.238
(1.02)
THERMO 0.0745
(0.41)
0.142
(0.20)
0.0735
(0.78)
0.104
(0.79)
SHFM −0.223
(−0.35)
−0.0458
(−0.02)
−0.274
(−1.27)
−0.0980
(−0.33)
CASH −0.157
(−0.41)
−0.124
(−0.23)
−0.277
(−1.21)
−0.273
(−1.58)
DUR −0.0599
(−0.64)
0.0289
(0.04)
−0.0644
(−0.98)
0.00238
(0.04)
ARUNUP −0.0452
(−0.21)
−0.380
(−0.17)
−0.104
(−0.40)
−0.297
(−1.59)
−0.481
(−3.48)***
−0.0497
(−1.41)
Constant 0.929
(1.26)
−0.0793
(−0.03)
0.321
(0.67)
−0.448
(−0.97)
−0.776
(−2.30)*
−0.0449
(−0.53)
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Table 6 continued
AdjAmih RelSprd AdjAmih RelSprd AdjAmih RelSprd
Panel A Panel B Panel C
Eq: ΔdTP
RELSIZE 4.211
(5.18)***
0.137
(0.42)
DBTEQ −0.0734
(−0.28)
−0.142
(−1.22)
RELBMV −0.0175
(−0.48)
0.0274
(1.34)
INVPRCE −0.652
(−0.58)
0.578
(1.09)
σTgtTurno −355.1
(−2.22)*
−110.1
(−1.32)
Constant −0.634
(−0.59)
1.273
(3.06)**
Hansen’s J-statistic 11.94 20.43
p_HanJ 0.939 0.976 0.736 0.684
p_EndoC 0.400 0.503 0.571 0.985
p_Redn 0.0008*** 0.00371** 0.00149** 0.00422**
This table reports coefficients from GMM estimation of the system of nonlinear equations of the parent-adjusted
CAR on parent illiquidity and other covariates, and its difference from target stock on several covariates before
the deal announcement. Panel A follows the nonlinear formulation (30) estimated with iterative GMM, Panel
B employs a third-order Taylor expansion of the nonlinear term β2 d
T P
1−β3dT P 	 c1d
T P + c2
(
dT P
)2
+
c3
(
dT P
)3
+ c4
(
dT P
)4
and the same covariates as in Panel A, estimated with two stages GMM, and
Panel C reports results from estimating the Taylor polynomial formulation with continuously updated GMM
estimator or CUE of Hansen et al. (1996), with fewer covariates to facilitate convergence. Year dummy
variables are employed as instruments in every formulation. Each column lists the coefficients estimated,
employing, from left to right AdjAmih and RelSprd to calculate target versus parent liquidity difference and
parent illiquidity, the description of which can be found in the “Appendix”. In Panel A, Eq: CARP denotes
the formulation E P (C AR0)  c + β1d P + β2 dT P1−β3dT P + β4d
T P + βX + γI + u and Eq: ΔdTP denotes
dT P  ζX +κI +v from expression (10). Row ΔdTP reports the coefficient of the difference of target minus
parent average stock illiquidity 252 trading days and up to 42 days before the deal announcement. dP is the
parent liquidity discount and β2 and β3, each of the coefficients in the nonlinear expression β2 d
T P
1−β3dT P .
Covariates RELBMV, RELSIZE, INVPRCE, DBTEQ, SILCX, THERMO, SHFM, NEGEQ, CASH, and
DUR are described in Table 4. ARUNUP is the estimated bidder stock run-up 41 trading days before the
deal announcement, adjusted for infrequent trading. σTgtTurno is the coefficient of the standard deviation of
the target stock’s 252 trading days and up to 42 days before the deal announcement. The reported Hansen
J-statistic of the test for over-identifying restrictions at the bottom of Panel A is not significant. Panel B reports
the coefficients of the third-order Taylor polynomial expansion of the nonlinear term in expression (30) and
the rest of the covariates listed in Panel A, estimated with two-stages GMM. At the bottom of the panel,
the probability of accepting the null hypothesis of instrument validity, p_HanJ, from a Hansen’s J test, of
accepting the null of ΔdTP endogeneity, p_EndoC, from a difference-in-Sargan statistic, and accepting the
null hypothesis of instrument redundancy, p_Redn, are listed for each alternative specification. In Panel C,
the coefficients from the CUE GMM estimation of the Taylor expansion formulation of the nonlinear model
with reduced covariates are reported. The partial derivative of liquidity difference on parent CAR, based on
the delta method, ∂C AR
P
∂dT P , is additionally reported
Coefficient t-statistics and z-statistics, for derivatives, are reported in parentheses, with +indicating significance
at the α0.10 level, * at the 0.05 level, ** at the 0.01 level, and *** at the 0.001 level
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iterative, two-stage Taylor expansion and CUE GMM results consistently indicate that thin-
ner illiquidity differences between the parent and its subsidiary drive statistically significant
higher bidder CAR. This is indicated either through the significant negative coefficient of
the nonlinear denominator β3 in the full model in Panel A, the negative squared illiquidity
difference in the Taylor polynomial full model in Panel B, or the first partial derivative of
illiquidity difference on parent CAR in the reduced Taylor expanded model in Panel C. Its
negative effect supports Massa and Xu’s (2013) findings of higher bidder CAR in acquisi-
tions of listed versus unlisted firms, and its nonlinearity justifies our suggested theoretical
formulation.
5.3 Liquidity transfer and overbidding
To clarify liquidity transfer’s role on the market’s assessment of the probability that a deal
is over/underbid, a series of centile regressions are run, with the probability PROB ITM that
market participants endogenously assign to the cash deal outcome as the dependent variable,
and liquidity transfer as the independent variable. PROB ITM is estimated, as described in
Sect. 3.3, following Madan et al. (2008) formulation. Centile regression is selected because of
the nonlinear role liquidity transfer plays on the probability of upward bid revisions, modeled
in Sect. 3.3 with the put getting more ITM, i.e. increasing its moneyness. Following Amihud
et al. (2004) model, either a small or a large liquidity transfer can generate a successful deal
outcome so long as the offer exceeds the pre-tender market price. Hence, we do not expect
a linear relation between liquidity transfer and the probability that the put is ITM. Centile
regression is run across alternative PROB ITM centiles to gauge liquidity transfer’s impact
for different probabilities.
For the sake of establishing a base case scenario, Table 7 lists results for the median
ITM PROB regression. For robustness, a number of control variables are used, described in
Sect. 5.1 above. In addition, a series of unreported regressions with alternative standardized
liquidity transfer variables on the basis of a series of liquidity proxies give the same qualitative
results.
Results from the median regression are reported on Table 7. The median probability the
put option gets in the money, assuming no liquidity transfer, is the regression constant 0.552.
The market expected Thermo-Electron freezout deals to have an increased probability of
overbidding, at a 0.10 level of significance, in line with the upward revisions in one out
of three Thermo-electron deals in the sample. Results show, as expected, liquidity transfer
having an overall negative impact on the probability of overbidding.
As discussed in the first paragraph above, liquidity transfer is not expected to affect
the probability of overbidding in a linear way. The nonlinear impact of liquidity transfer is
clarified in Fig. 2, which compares the estimated coefficients of the liquidity transfer covariate
across centile regressions for every sample centile, at an increasing 5% step of the probability
the option gets in the money. The top line represents the 95% confidence interval for the 5%
PROB ITM sample centile regression, and the bottom line the same 95% confidence interval
for the 95% PROB ITM centile. Figure 2 indicates that for the lower PROB ITM centiles
up to and including the 40% centile of PROB ITM equal to 12.5%, coefficients are either
not or barely significantly different from zero. Hence, liquidity transfer has no significant
impact in deals for which the market assigns a lower probability of overbidding. For median
to higher PROB ITM sample centiles, liquidity transfer has a clear negative impact on the
probability of overbidding. According to Amihud et al. (2004) model, there is no requirement
for upward bid revision or to bid higher if there is enough value to bidders to cover the deal cost
plus the value of the firm under incumbent management. The reported regression coefficient
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Table 7 Median regression of the probability the option gets in the money (ITM)
PROB ITM
std_LTRelsprd −0.0000152
(−4.35)***
ARUNUP −0.299
(−1.34)
RELBMV 0.0058
(0.18)
RELSIZE 0.0156
(0.19)
THERMO 0.142
(1.92)+
NEGEQ −0.0185
(−0.22)
SHFM −0.051
(−0.66)
SILCX −0.00591
(−0.14)
INVPRCE 0.0173
(0.78)
Constant 0.552
(6.33)***
N 107
This table reports coefficients from quantile regression of the probability the offered option to participate
in a cash squeeze-out bid gets in the money, PROB ITM, until squeeze-out bid expiration on standardized
liquidity transfer std_LTRelsprd, calculated with the relative spread liquidity proxy, which is described in the
“Appendix”, and covariates RELBMV, RELSIZE, INVPRCE, SILCX, THERMO, SHFM, NEGEQ, CASH,
and ARUNUP, described in Table 4
Heteroscedasticity robust t-statistics are reported in parentheses, with +indicating significance at the α0.10
level, * at the 0.05 level, ** at the 0.01 level, and *** at the 0.001 level
point estimates in Fig. 2 show that liquidity transfer synergy drives prospective acquirers
to successfully conclude their bids by overbidding less than their counterparts with lower
liquidity transfer values. The coefficient point estimates allude to the role liquidity transfer
synergy can play but only in deals with a higher potential for overbidding, exhibiting PROB
ITM very close to or higher than the sample median.
6 Conclusion
This paper examines whether acquirers can earn superior abnormal returns by transferring
their superior liquidity to less liquid targets taken private. The transfer of liquidity is posited
as an additional synergy in mergers and acquisitions, stemming from the stock liquidity
difference between the bidder and its target. This synergy is evaluated drawing on theoretical
and empirical evidence from the squeeze-out stage of going private transactions. Assuming
that liquidity is priced, an analysis is developed to account for the expected benefit accruing
to a bidder’s valuation from upgrading the liquidity of its toehold in illiquid target shares after
removing them from the exchange. The value derived from the acquirer’s superior bidder
liquidity being transferred to the valuation of its toehold is factored into the decision to proceed
with the squeeze-out. The estimated added value, stemming from liquidity transfer according
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Fig. 2 Impact of liquidity transfer across sample centiles. Coefficients of PROB ITM centile regressions on
liquidity transfer are shown in the figure, with coefficients from growing PROB ITM centiles from the top
line (5% PROB ITM centile, denoted as qr2_5 in the legend) to the bottom (95% PROB ITM centile, denoted
as qr2 95 in the legend). The estimated coefficient is the middle point of each line, and its 95% confidence
interval extends through the line’s width
to the existing SEC rules, escapes the entire fairness valuation rule, leaving room for bidders
to avoid overbidding. This synergy, based on our theoretical analysis, depends on individual
counterparty stock illiquidity and their liquidity differences, which in turn nonlinearly affect
the expected cumulative abnormal returns and the reservation deal premium of prospective
acquirers.
Because more illiquid targets can be taken private at a lower premium, due to the absence
of arbitrageurs (Gomes 2001), the theoretically estimated added value from liquidity trans-
fer can, in this case, benefit the acquirers more than squeezing-out firms with less illiquid
stock. Empirical evidence from our sample of the entire freeze-out universe in the US
markets initiated by globally listed acquirers between 1990 and 2014 not only shows that
controllers’ stock is many times more liquid than their subsidiaries’ before the deal announce-
ment but also that toehold size influences target illiquidity. Estimations take into account
the infrequent trading witnessed in the sample, and relevant liquidity proxies are accord-
ingly adjusted for trade-to-trade returns (Maynes and Rumsey 1993), an adjustment missing
from the relevant squeeze-out literature, including Bates et al. (2006) and Cheung et al.
(2015). The median estimated liquidity transferring synergy can amount to up to 20.9% in
stock and 7.2% in cash offer deal premiums, with a positive contribution in 72.6% of the
deals and a median value of $2.93 million, on the basis of Chacko et al. (2008) liquidity
proxy. In the US market environment, prospective acquirers, controlling sizeable toeholds
of their targets, enjoy an advantageous downward sloping stock demand curve environ-
ment, which supports thinner stock market trading for their target (Lin et al. 2009). The
extent to which self-dealing bidders can increase targets’ illiquidity by buying additional
stock, extracting a disproportionate share of the deal’s generated wealth, is left for future
research.
To correctly interpret deal generated wealth, target cumulative abnormal returns are
estimated by subtracting from market prices the attached option to participate in the
squeeze-out offer. The option-adjusted minimum target CAR (OACAR) is estimated based
on a novel method employing Heston and Nandi’s (2000) stochastic volatility frame-
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work for cash, alongside Bjerksund and Stensland’s (1993) method for stock exchange
offers. This methodological improvement can cast additional light on the cash offerings
literature, which to date largely relies on non-stochastic volatility to estimate the under-
lying target’s theoretical equity value (Bhagat et al. 1987). This is an area for future
research.
Empirical results show that parent bid announcement CAR is significantly higher in deals
with more liquid parents and more illiquid targets, in which targets exhibit lower OACAR. The
theoretically proposed nonlinear relation of parent CAR, adjusted for its toehold appreciation,
with liquidity differences between target and bidder stock, is confirmed, becoming more
positive the more pronounced their illiquidity difference. Target OACAR is higher in cash
versus stock offers, underlying value driven motives behind the selection of exchange medium
(Fishman 1989; Eckbo and Thorburn 2000). Evidence that more illiquid targets are received
as better news in the market for bidders in cash than for stock is provided, which portrays
an impounded liquidity transfer synergy, coupled with a long-run liquidity improvement in
parents’ stock. The relatively more positive market reaction to bidder CAR for relatively
more illiquid targets can be partly attributed to the direct effect of liquidity transfer and
partly to the expectation of longer-run illiquidity improvement following a successful freeze-
out.
The extent to which the offering price exceeds the target’s underlying value upon the
offer’s expiration date is an important deal parameter (Borochin 2014). We develop a new
methodology to estimate the probability that the put option granted to the target’s minority
shareholders gets In The Money, i.e. its “moneyness,” and facilitate the associated proba-
bility of underbidding. The implied probability of moneyness is derived from the estimated
put option offered to target shareholders, employing a distribution of moneyness suggested
by Madan et al. (2008). The extension of our method to corporate finance deals in relevant
contexts is left to future researchers. On this basis, additional insights are gained on the
role of liquidity transfer in deal economics. It is shown to nonlinearly affect the market’s
assessment of the probability that bidders overbid, playing no role in deals in which market
consensus assigns a lower than median probability of overbidding, while strongly influ-
encing those with median and above median probability assessments. In the latter, higher
liquidity transfer synergy is associated with a lower probability of overbidding, underlying
Amihud et al. (2004) freeze-out model, which suggests that a small positive value margin
can ensure bidding success. Bidders with the benefit of liquidity transfer can complete deals
without commensurately raising premiums, because liquidity transfer is not estimated in
court fair valuation. The nonlinearity of liquidity transfer’s influence can not only act as
a catalyst for a favorable-to-bidder outcome but also a less expensive one, to the extent it
cannot get adjudicated. A more detailed analysis of the legal ramifications is left for future
researchers.
Open Access This article is distributed under the terms of the Creative Commons Attribution 4.0 Interna-
tional License (http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/), which permits unrestricted use, distribution, and
reproduction in any medium, provided you give appropriate credit to the original author(s) and the source,
provide a link to the Creative Commons license, and indicate if changes were made.
Appendix
See Table 8.
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Table 8 Description of liquidity proxies
Liquidity proxy Description
Amih, AdjAmih Amih is Amihud’s ILLIQ (Amihud 2002), which is estimated as the ratio
of the absolute daily return Rt multiplied by 1000 and divided by the
daily dollar volume $Volume:
Amiht  1000|Rt |$V olumet
Adjamih is the adjusted Amihud ratio estimated with the adjusted return
R˜t which is the ratio of Rt by the square root of NT days trading gap:
Ad jamiht  1000|Rt |√N T $V olumet 
1000
∣∣∣R˜t
∣∣∣
$V olumet
Relsprd Relsprd is the relative spread estimated as the closing day bid-ask spread
divided by the stock price:
Relsprd  Ask−BidPrice
Turno Turno is the turnover ratio estimated as the daily shares volume divided by
the total number of the company’s outstanding shares:
T urnot  V olumetOutstandingShares
Amivest Amivest is the inverse Amivest ratio (Datar et al. 1998), estimated as the
daily adjusted for infrequent trading absolute return multiplied by 1000
and divided by the number of shares traded daily:
Amivestt 
1000
∣∣∣R˜t
∣∣∣
V olumet
AdjRoll This is the Roll (1984) measure adjusted for non-negative price covariance
(Harris 1990) and non-trading days:
Ad jrollt 
⎧⎨
⎩
2
√
−Cov(R˜t , R˜t−1) if Cov(R˜t , R˜t−1) < 0
2
√
Cov(R˜t , R˜t−1) if Cov(R˜t , R˜t−1) ≥ 0
Gammaps Pastor and Stambaugh (2003) Gamma adjusted for non-trading is derived
from the regression of excess returns over the CRSP value-weighted
index returns ˜RMt , adjusted for thin trading, on daily dollar volume:
R˜t+1 + ˜RMt+1  θ + ϕ R˜t + (Gammat ) sign
[
R˜t
]
$V olumet + εt
LOT Goyenko et al.’s (2009) modification of the original Lesmond et al. (1999)
LOT measure is employed, which breaks down the maximization of
likelihood space on the basis of stock, not index, returns. It calculates the
implied difference between the costs of buying minus selling a stock.
After adjusting returns for non-trading days it is estimated as follows:
L OT  α2 j − α1 j
where:
R˜t  R˜∗t − α1 j for R˜∗t < α1 j
R˜t  R˜∗t for α1 j < R˜∗t < α2 j
R˜t  R˜∗t − α2 j for α2 j < R˜∗t
FHT Employed in research analysis of very illiquid markets (Marshall et al.
2013), it is estimated based on Fong et al. (2011), with the proportion of
zero stock returns z and the standard deviation of adjusted daily returns σ :
F H T  2σ N−1
(
1+z
2
)
123
Ann Oper Res (2019) 282:179–216 213
Table 8 continued
Liquidity proxy Description
Longst Longstaff and Schwartz’s (2001) option value for the maximum lack of
marketability discount, assuming the standard deviation of the annualized
daily stock returns is σ and T is the length of time the shares are illiquid:
Longst 
(
2 +
σ 2T
2
)
N (d) +
√
σ 2T
2π
e
− σ2T8 − 1
where d 
√
σ 2T
2
Longthn Longstaff and Schwartz’s (2001) version for the upper bound for the
thin-trading discount, which, in addition to the variables in the
marketability discount Longst, incorporates the length L of the interval
during which the investor can sell the illiquid security:
Longthn  (Pt + Longst) TL
∞∫
0
vF
T
L −1(v) f (v)dv,
F(v)  N
⎛
⎝ v −
σ2 L
2√
σ 2 L
⎞
⎠ − ev N
⎛
⎝−v −
σ2 L
2√
σ 2 L
⎞
⎠ ,
f (v)  2√
2πσ 2 L
eve
⎛
⎜⎜⎝
−
(
v+ σ
2 L
2
)2
2σ2 L
⎞
⎟⎟⎠
− eve
⎛
⎝ −v− σ
2 L
2√
σ2 L
⎞
⎠
Chacko Chacko et al. (2008) derive the cost of purchasing (+) or liquidating (−)
securities under a prevailing riskless rate r, security return volatility σ
and expected waiting time 1
λ
(
S
B
)
(Q)
for the completion of an order with
size Q as follows:
Chacko( −
+
)  − 1
ϕ( −
+
)(λ
(
S
B
)
)
where ϕ( −
+
)(λ
(
S
B
)
) 
(
1
2
− r
σ 2
)
∓
√√√√√√( 1
2
− r
σ 2
)2
+
2
(
r + λ
(
S
B
)
(Q)
)
σ 2
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